Revista Sur/Versión 1. Los nombres propios de nuestro Sur by Celarg Editorial - Issuu
amor platonic amor platónico. amor proprie amor ascendente sub 1. antepassado; 2. ascendante colo; intestino grosso (cólon ascendente, transversal, descendente e sigmóide). dialectica sub dialectica relation sub relação. curso|course ruta|course plato|course trayectoria|course corredor|courser corte |court amigos|friends amigas|friends amistad|friendship friso|frieze fragata| frigate herederos|issue descendencia|issue flujo|issue proceder|issue crecer| issue planear|soar elevarse|soar ascendente|soaring sollozo|sob sollozar| sob. Factores de la complejidad Dialéctica de Máximo Aristotele e la tradizione platonica, (International Plato Studies, 21) 89, 15, lo emplea en sentido de « descendente», pero también, Comm. .. en sentido ascendente, tenemos las virtudes políticas, las catárquicas, las intelectuales y, en la.
When the sixth child, Zeus, was born Rhea sought Gaia to devise a plan to save them and to eventually get retribution on Cronus for his acts against his father and children. Once he had grown up, Zeus used an emetic given to him by Gaia to force Cronus to disgorge the contents of his stomach in reverse order: This would lead the Olympians in a ten-year war against the Titans, before driving them defeated into the pit of Tartaros.
Many years later, Zeus released Kronos and his brothers from this prison, and made the old Titan king of the Elysian Islands, in the Underworld.
The Practical Wisdom that Metis represented. By swallowing Metis, however, Zeus had gained wisdom as part of his intrinsic nature. Episteme, Techne, Metis and Phronesis: For the Greeks and particularly for Plato, Episteme and Techne represented knowledge of an order completely different from Metis.
Noesis, or dialectic reason, is the method used by Episteme. Techne is based on logical deduction from self-evident first principles. For Plato and Aristotle it is the part of the soul which perceives abstract truths. Cunning intelligence would later be defined as Phronesis.
Metis represented a wide array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment. In the morning, the blind Cyclops let the sheep out to graze. But Odysseus and his men had tied themselves to the undersides of the animals and that was how they managed to finally get away. Vassar Head of Polyphemus. Finally, the Trojan Horse. It is not a minor detail, either, that Odysseus is traditionally aided by Athena, the Goddess of Wisdom.
- "El Mundo Visible es Sólo un Pretexto" / "The Visible World is Just a Pretext".-
- Archive for the ‘Nietzsche’ Category
In all its facets and faces of the same phenomenon lies a peculiar kind of behavior. However, despite its relevance, Metis as type of Intelligent ability has been also relegated, criticized and even despised. Plato intentionally ignored it, keeping it aside in his Gnoseological Theory. In turn, he enthroned the discursive Episteme, clearly much more acceptable to him, as he considered that Episteme was related to the highest degree of Knowledge. The sensible realm is permeated by a dissipative and disaggregating "logic", an irreparable tendency to losing itself in the infinite, only contained by the integrating force of the idea.
The sensible realm takes on the dissipative function, formerly carried out by the not-being in Gorgias, while the intelligible realm, the only being in the full sense of the word, takes on the unifying function, rendered feasible by the methexis or participation of the sensible in the intelligible.
It happens that, brought to its logical conclusion, this dualist version would lead to the affirmation of the full ontological independence of both poles of the opposition, leading into the reciprocal enigma of a One without a Many, and vice-versa, and rendering the very doctrine of participation unfeasible. This is what will become explicit in the overwhelming criticism to this reading that we find in the Parmenides dialogue. This criticism ironically is conveyed by the homonymous character of a young, immature Socrates who appears as the defender of the theory of ideas in its dualist version.
Among the various objections I would like to highlight two that appear decisive. The first is the famous objection of the "third man", as it will later be called by Aristotle If the idea takes care of the unity of sensible multiplicity, what ensures the unity of this new multiplicity that was introduced now, not concerning the plurality of the sensible, but the counterpoint itself between sensible and intelligible? Would we need a new idea here?
That is, besides the idea of man that takes care of the unit underlying the many men who appear in the sensible realm, would we now need a third one, neither ideal, nor a phenomenon, that would ensure the unity of the idea of man and his phenomenic counterpart?
But, needing a "third man", would we not need a fourth and a fifth? The second critique concerns the deficit inherent to the way of proceeding itself, in which the theory of ideas is rooted, a procedure that we might describe as typological.
Let us assume that ideas exist for noble things, such as human beings, justice, beauty, etc. If to each group of phenomena we attribute a corresponding form, and there are potentially infinite groups of phenomena to be discovered in the sensible realm, would there also be infinite forms?
If that were so, the ontology of ideas would be in trouble, since the tendency to become lost in the infinite of the sensible realm would be transferred to the intelligible realm, which would completely lose its unifying function.
A topic in descending dialectic From the epistemological standpoint, on the other hand, the advocate of the theory of ideas, far from being able to explain the sensible world by appealing to direct knowledge of ideas, would always be trailing behind the new discoveries made, every moment, by those who describe the phenomena and always revealing new patterns to be "explained"; ideas would be a posteriori conceptual duplications of the phenomena, and the knowledge of the intelligible would be, deep down, a purely misleading artifice.
Could the theory of ideas actually be the work of Socrates Burnet, Taylor 30? Here it is not possible to take a position regarding this complex issue, but I would like to suggest an hypothesis, possibly to be developed in future work, in that Plato might actually be reviewing the dualist reading that comes through in Phaedo and in the Republic, and slowly going towards an increasingly sophisticated and non-dualist version of his ontology.
I also believe that this self-critical development can be found in the exoteric work of Plato itself, namely, in the written dialogues, even if we can reinforce the understanding of what would be his late ontology, with an appeal to the esoteric unwritten work.Método dialéctico marxista - Axel Juárez
What is this new? A gradual integration of the Many to the sphere of the first principles. The distinction between intelligible and sensible, especially in the Republic already gives the Gorgian not-being an ontological status, accepting, as opposed to the theory of Parmenides, that the Many have their own ontological locus. However, with the impasse of the dualist reading that, on supposing the excluding 30 See Ross,p. A topic in descending dialectic opposition between the One and the Many, ultimately makes the theory of participation unfeasible as shown by Parmenidesthe not-being ultimately is reconsidered and gains an entirely new ontological status, and is elevated to a moment in the theory itself of the great kinds in the Sophist dialogue.
Finally, as we shall see, Philebus marks the rise of a daring ontological theory in which the One and the Many appear as the great kinds and the fundamental causes of all that exists. It should be noted that in the dualist version, motion would be an appropriate category to describe the sensible, but now the category appears in symmetrical opposition to its pair, rest.
Now Plato will bring to the light the central trait of all of ontology that considers itself dialectic, its relational character: Rest is not motion and motion is not rest, but both are. What do we want to say when we state that something is? As we saw previously, being does not indicate only existence, but an existence permeated by logos, and the central trait of this logos is full identity and determination.
Rest and motion, as they hold the primary trait of self-identity, participate in being, but as they are different among themselves, they participate in the not-being, and here Plato finds the answer to the central question of the Sophist: While rest and motion only participate among themselves indirectly through the mediation of being, identity and difference participate among themselves directly.
Treated in its relative sense, being is only the other of the difference, namely identity; considered in its absolute sense, being can and should be treated as the full autonomous self-reference, the full self-identity of the One itself. Here we have not only a relational ontology, but an elaborate conceptualization of the hierarchical structure among kinds, since rest and motion are clearly below identity and difference, due to the force of their mutual relationship, since they depend on the presence of a third, the being, to ensure their bonding.
A topic in descending dialectic introduced by Philebus, which elevates the One and the Many, peras and apeiron, to co-originary and mutually determined principles, namely to correlative opposites that would reside in the heart of Platonic metaphysics. This is the main thesis that I want to advocate here: Let me use an even more ordinary image, by one who has so often taken his children to contemporaneous birthday parties, real banquets for the parents… Imagine yourself standing before a table full of sweet and savory party snacks of all kinds, a remarkable invitation to extravagant eating.
The blind impulse that will soon emerge to satisfy desire, and will result in a day of excesses, lies at the core itself of the logic of pleasure, structured by the tendency to lose oneself in the infinite or the unlimited apeiron. In its self-organizing activity, as we would say today, our body is not guided by a movement of potentiation of the One, of the limit and suppression of the Many, of the unlimited, but by an adequate balance between both, for an adequate measure which is the immanent target of this game of the One and the Many forged by the nous or Intelligence, not only the abstract intelligence of thinking, which, consciously, limits the will, but the spontaneous intelligence of our own body in its movement of self-organization, and finally of the entire universe, as ruled by a universal nous These arguments are, in my opinion, sufficient to show that the strict dualism between the One ideas and the Many sensible objects that occurs in Platonism, already challenged in Parmenides and in the Sophist, collapses completely from Philebus onwards.
In this sense, it is not possible to speak, as Gaiser wishes, of an "insuperable dualism"41 of principles, since dualism is only applied to radically independent ontological spheres or entities. We can talk about dualism between intelligible and sensible, in the case of Platonism, or between res extensa 40 Philebus, in: A topic in descending dialectic and res cogitans in Descartes, or between thing-in-itself and phenomenon in Kant, but one can in no way speak of dualism, when what is at stake is precisely the contrary, the nonindependence of the One and the Many, that is their correlative opposition.
There is no One without Many, nor vice-versa. Even so, we may counter this argument, Plato is not proposing a symmetrical relationship between the One and the Many. Possibly, even emphasizing the correlative character of the One and the Many in Philebus, Plato still had in mind that the universal nous aims at the measure or the order that are given precisely by the predominance of the One over the Many. In this way we would be very close to the reconstruction of the late philosophy of Plato proposed by Gaiser Possibly this was, in fact, the answer given by Plato to the enigma of the Many in his late philosophy.
However it should be asked what would happen if we continued the path blazed by Plato, emphasizing not only the correlative character of the One and the Many, but an unbiased approach to logos or objective reason.
We then have two categories at the core of Greek metaphysics: A topic in descending dialectic denial of determination or in its entire abstraction if possible from the One, the pure and simple indetermination. These two abstractions, of the One toward the Many, and vice-versa, imply Platonism. Now, it is precisely this abstraction that the decisive sentence of Philebus is denying: There may be the maximum predominance of the One over the Many, or vice-versa, but there cannot be the One without the Many, or vice-versa.
The strangeness of this strictly dialectical reading of the first principles presented by the late Plato left its marks in Aristotle: For a these are modifications and accidents, rather than substrata, of numbers and magnitudes —the many and few of number, and the great and small of magnitude— like even and odd, smooth and rough, straight and curved. Again, b apart from this mistake, the great and the small, and so on, must be relative to something; but what is relative is least of all things a kind of entity or substance, and is posterior to quality and quantity" But this is precisely the thesis of the late Plato.
The elevation of the Many to a correlative category of the One, implies: Now this thesis implies the collapse of the dualism between sensible and intelligible.
We could talk at most of a rich hierarchical ontology in which ontological 43 I wish to highlight the fact that Schleiermacher translated peras and apeiron respectively as determination Bestimmung and indetermination Unbestimmtheit see SW, v. VIII, 16cinstead of the usual limit and unlimitedness. Plato, Complete Works Now, an unrestricted field of possibilities is no field at all. A topic in descending dialectic levels follow each other from the less determined to the most determined, or vice-versa.
As previously mentioned, we do not know whether in fact Plato extracted all the consequences of this radical thesis, but we should do this all the same.
Nietzsche | ⚡️La Audacia de Aquiles⚡️
Dialectical ontology is a relational ontology: This is the very universal law inherent to all there is or can be, the objective reason that pervades every being. But what do we understand by "coherence"? Should we understand the principle of coherence, the universal law of dialectical ontology, just as the positive version of the principle of non-contradiction47?
As we have seen, the principle of non-contradiction has the function of preserving a biased comprehension of being, understood as pure identity. However, maybe even in the late Plato, the bias toward the One remains, and with this the assumption that measure and the reason only occur in the predominance of the One and its characteristic notes —identity, invariance and determination— over the Many and its notes —difference, variation and underdetermination—.
See also Theunissen, A topic in descending dialectic What do I consider here to be network ontology? Existing is not precisely being, but being in the tense process of determination which aims at coherence, and when it does not achieve it falls apart or becomes lost in incoherence. Coherence is the immanent target, the attractor of the entire process of determination, but there are many, potentially infinite ways of carrying it out between the extremes of the maximum predominance of the One over the Many, or vice-versa.
While it occurs in the extreme face of the maximum predominance of the One over the Many, coherence is manifested as order, while when it occurs at the opposite face of the extreme predominance of the Many over the One, coherence is expressed as chaos. Now let us perform an unusual thought experiment. A topic in descending dialectic his own despair —or not? Where would this trip end? Apparently nowhere, or rather at a greater and greater distance between the two travelers. But this is not what in fact would occur.
Both the opposite manifestations of coherence revert, at their extremes, one into the other and, in their continuous oscillation, coincide. In this brief thought experiment, we delimited the map of the dynamic logical space, the field of all possible thoughts and all possible forms of existence.
A topic in descending dialectic Following our path in descending dialectic, we can articulate this strictly speculative theory with one of the lines that are in the foreground of contemporary science, network science. Thus we will not be deducing the regional ontologies from the general ontology, but articulating them and evaluating their mutual compatibility. We cannot prove the truth of general ontology based on the regional ontologies, but we can refute it with robust empirical counterproof or accurate counterarguments.